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Abstract
Conventional two-sided matching game is a one-period game. In this note, we contribute to
the existing literature by examining a multi-period two-sided matching problem allowing for
the possibility of a divorce. We assume that the matching game is played repeatedly and the
payoff matrix changes over time. It is shown that the rule of divorce will affect the
equilibrium of a marriage game. An empirical implication of our result is that a country with
a well-developed financial market will have a better marital outcome as compared to a
less-developed country.
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The Two-sided matching theory has ample applications. In particular, the
theory is widely applied to model the marriage market. However, most stud-
ies in the existing literature focus on a single-period matching game. In the
conventional studies, it is usually assumed that each player chooses a partner
to maximize their expected payoﬀ in a one-shot manner (Becker, 1976, 1981;
Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). In the real world, state of nature changes over
time and a divorce may happen (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Becker et al., 1977;
McAfee, 1992; Weiss, 1997). A one-shot two-sided matching game may not
be able to characterize the divorce behavior. Therefore, a more complete
matching game should also consider the possibility of a change of the state
of nature.
This note extends the conventional one-shot matching game to a dynamic
T-period (1 <T<∞) game allowing for the possibility of a divorce. We
consider two popular forms of divorce, namely, divorce that requires mutual
consents and the unilateral (no-fault) divorce. We also compare the outcomes
between the cases with and without a transfer.
Let H = {m1,m 2,...,mn} be a set of men, F = {f1,f 2,...,f n} be a
set of women and E be the set of all conceivable outcomes. For instance,
everybody remains single is an element in E. I na ne c o n o m yc o n s i s t i n go f
n men and n women, with heterosexual one-to-one marriage and remaining





2 (n − s)!1.
The marriage market is said to be cleared if everybody gets married.Suppose
preferences are substitutable2 and suppose the state of nature is known in the
beginning of each period. Without loss of generality, the return for remaining
1This comes from the facts that there are (n
s)w a y so fp i c k i n gs singles from n men
or women, and (n − s)! possible combinations of the remaining (n − s) pairs of men and
women.
2See Deﬁnition 6.2 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
2single is assumed to be zero. Suppose the payoﬀ of marriage is split evenly
b e t w e e nh u s b a n da n dw i f e ,T a b l e s1a n d2s h o wh o wm u c he a c hi n d i v i d u a l
will get in a marriage game with T = n =2 .
f1 f2 f1 f2
m1 23 m1 15 1





In period 1, all women prefer m2 and all men prefer f2.T h u s , m2 will
choose f2 and therefore m1 will marry f1 since getting married is assumed to
be better than remaining single. In period 2, both men prefer f1. Hence, f1
marries m2 and m1 marries f2 is the equilibrium. The equilibrium is optimal
since it maximizes the total payoﬀ in both periods. We will examine how the
rule of divorce alters the equilibrium in a multi-period marriage game.
2 Mutual-Consent Divorce without a Trans-
fer
Suppose the divorce rule is mutual consent without a transfer. For simplicity,
we also assume that the discount rate is zero. In period 1, both women prefer
m2 and his decision determines the outcome of the game. If m2 would like to
maximize his return for period 1 only, he will choose f2.A sar e s u l t ,m1 will
marry f1. In period 2, however, m2 would like to divorce f2 and f1 would
like to divorce m1. The problem is that m1 does not want to be divorced.
Consequently, f1 cannot divorce m1.S i n c e m2 cannot ﬁnd someone to get
married with if he divorces f2, by the assumption that remaining single is
worse than getting married, m2 and f2 will not divorce each other. As such,
m2 will only get a payoﬀ o f1 2 ( 1 1+1 )i nb o t hp e r i o d s ,w h i l eh ec a ng e ta
3payoﬀ of 25(9+16) if he chooses f1 in the ﬁrst period. This implies that the
o u t c o m ei ne a c hp e r i o di nam u l t i - p e r i o dm a r r i a g eg a m em a yb ed i ﬀerent
from the outcome of a single-period game.
3 Mutual-Consent Divorce with a Transfer
One may wonder if the example can yield an optimal outcome if a transfer
is allowed. It can be shown that the result may remain unchanged even if
an intra-temporal transfer and saving are allowed. To see this, assume that
inter-couple and intra-couple transfers are allowed at zero transaction cost
and that the payoﬀ is not perishable. However, we assume that people cannot
borrow against their future.
If m2 marries f2 in the ﬁrst period, he will ask m1 to divorce f1 in the
second period. The minimal compensation for m1 to divorce f1 is 14(15−1),
so that he is indiﬀerent between f1 and f2.
Despite the fact that f1 would like to divorce m1,s h ec a n n o ta ﬀord 14.
What she can aﬀord is 1. This means that m2 h a st op a ya tl e a s t1 3t om1,
and m2 can get at most 3(16 − 1 3 )i np e r i o d2 ,s ot h a tt h et o t a lf o rm2 in
both periods is 14(11 + 3).
However, if m2 marries f1 in period 1, he does not need to compensate
anybody in period 2, so that he can make 25(9+16) totally. Thus, if nobody
pays m2 in period 1, he will not marry f2. It should be mentioned that f2 is
willing to pay at most 8 to m2 in period 1, but this is insuﬃcient as 22(14+8)
is less than 25.
Note that m1 w o u l da l s ol i k et op a ys o m e b o d yt om a k eh i m s e l fn o tt o
marry f2 in the ﬁr s tp e r i o di no r d e rt oa v o i dg e t t i n gap a y o ﬀ of 1 in the
second period. However, even if m1 pays 2 to m2, it is still not enough to
bribe m2 not to marry f1 in period 1. Thus, m1 would like make a contract
with m2 to charge him a lower compensation in period 2. Such a contract,
4however, is time inconsistent. Once m2 has married f2 in period 1, m1 will
not demand any compensation less than 14 in period 2.
Thus, the ﬁnal outcome will be: m2 marries f1, m1 marries f2 in period 1
and nobody gets divorced in period 2. This is not a social optimal outcome.
Therefore, in a society where people could not borrow against their future,
the equilibrium marital status in a multi-period marriage game may not be
optimal.
4 Unilateral Divorce
Under no-fault divorce, people get divorced as long as at least one party
terminates the marriage contract.
If divorce is unilateral and if there is no transfer, m2 does not need to
compensate m1 in period 2 as f1 would like to divorce m1.T h u s , m2 will
marry f2 in the ﬁrst period to maximize his total return (11 + 16).
People now become myopic. If a man knows that the woman he prefers
in the next period is willing to marry him, the problem reduces to a single-
period marriage game.
If transfer is feasible, then m2 will choose f2 in period 1, m1 is willing
t op a yu pt o1 4t of1 for not divorcing him in period 2. Now, m2 needs to
pay at least 13 to f1 to attract her and he can get a payoﬀ of 3 at most in
the second period. The right of getting compensation goes to f1 now. If m2
marries f1 in period 1, m1 will seduce f1 in period 2 by paying her up to
14(15 − 1), and f1 will divorce m2 if he does not react. In both cases, m2
g e t sa tm o s t3i np e r i o d2 .H e n c e ,m2 will marry f2 in period 1 to maximize
his ﬁrst-period return.
Proposition 1: If
(i) Preferences are substitutable;
5(ii) Intra-temporal transfer (a transfer within or across couples) is allowed;
(iii) Inter-temporal transfer (i.e., saving and borrowing against the future)
is feasible;
then, the equilibrium marital status in a ﬁnite multi-period marriage-
divorce game will be optimal irrespective of the form of divorce.
Proof.
Consider a T-period (0 <T<∞) game. Since the payoﬀ is intratempo-
rally transferable, the outcome in the last period will be in the core. Thus,
in the last period, the payoﬀ should be maximized.
Given that people know their marital status in period T and given the
rule of divorce, they will make a choice in period (T − 1) to maximize the
sum of the payoﬀ in periods (T − 1) and T. By the same argument, the
strategy adopted in period (T − 2) has to maximize the total payoﬀ of the
last three periods. By deduction, the ﬁrst period decision maximizes the
payoﬀ of all the T periods. The payoﬀ of all the T periods is maximized if
and only if the payoﬀ in every single period is maximized. Therefore, the
outcome is optimal.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This note extends the conventional one-period two-side matching game to
multi-period to allow for the possibility of a divorce. The model discussed
here is simple and technically tractable. We show that in a society where
people cannot borrow against their future, the game may not have an optimal
outcome. It is found that if preferences are substitutable and if intra- and
inter-temporal transfers are feasible, the equilibrium marital outcome max-
imizes the total payoﬀ of a society. An important implication of our result
is that a society with a well-developed ﬁnancial market will have a better
6marital outcome as compared to a ﬁnancially less-developed society.
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